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INTRODUCTION 
This Reply Brief is limited to the issues raised by Appellee 
in its Brief of Appellee relative to Appellee's Cross-Appeal. 
Those issues are: (i) whether the district court erroneously 
denied Walker's motion for attorney's fees incurred in defending 
against Sparks' Motion to Assign Lease and For Declaratory Relief; 
and (ii) whether the district court erred in denying Walker's 
request for attorney's fees incurred in bringing its Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING WALKER'S MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN DEFENDANT AGAINST SPARKS' MOTION 
TO ASSIGN LEASE AND FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF. 
The district court erroneously determined that the Lease un-
derlying the dispute between Walker and Sparks had been terminated, 
and that while Sparks' Motion to Assign Lease And For Declaratory 
Relief arose out of the Lease, it also arose out of post-judgment 
requests for remedies. Relying on this erroneous determination, 
the district court denied Walker's motion for attorney's fees in 
successfully defending against Sparks' motion. Brief of Appellee 
at 23. 
Sparks maintains, in Appellants' Reply Brief and Brief in 
Opposition to Cross-Appeal ("Appellants' Reply Brief"), that the 
attorneys fee provision contained within the Lease does not allow 
for the recovery for attorney's fees as requested by Walker. 
Appellants' Reply Brief at 17-18. This assertion ignores the plain 
language of Article 46, as well as the events as they transpired. 
Article 46 of the Lease states: 
In case of suit shall be brought for recovery of 
possession of the leased premises, for the recovery of 
rent or any other amount due under the provisions of the 
Lease, or because of the breach of any other covenant 
herein contained on part of the Lessee to be kept or 
performed, and a breach shall be established, the de-
faulting shall pay to the other all expenses incurred 
therefor, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Addendum "B" to Brief of Appellee at 25-26. 
Clearly, the Complaint filed by Walker in the Third District 
Court seeking Judgment against Sparks for delinquent rent, late 
fees, interest, attorney's fees, restitution of the premises, and 
future rent (R. 2-45) was a suit "brought for recovery of posses-
sion of the leased premises, for the recovery of rent or any other 
amount due . . . ." No one can dispute that Sparks' Motion for 
Assignment of the Lease or in the Alternative Motion for Declarato-
ry Judgment was brought as part of the same suit and after Walker 
prevailed in its claims for relief. Sparks' motion was brought 
under the same caption, with the same civil number and the same 
Judge. 
Sparks seems to suggest, in Appellants' Reply Brief, that 
since its motion was filed after the Judgment had been rendered, 
instead of before, the motion was not a part of the same suit which 
had been brought for recovery of possession and rent. Sparks 
stated: "Unlike the situations contemplated and listed in Article 
46, Sparks' post-judgment motions did not request a finding that 
one party was 'defaulting' or recovery from a defaulting party." 
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Appellants' Reply Brief at 18. This statement is misleading for 
two reasons. 
First, while Sparks' motion itself did not request a finding 
of default, Sparks had already been deemed the defaulting party for 
purposes of this suit. As the prevailing party, Walker is entitled 
to attorney's fees in pursuing claims and in defending against the 
baseless assertions and defenses of Sparks. Second, while Sparks 
initially requested an assignment of the substitute lease, its 
later ethereal re-characterization of the same motion--to a "motion 
to establish a more efficient mechanism for administering remaining 
obligations11 --did not change the basic nature of the motion. It 
was and continued to be a motion under which Sparks sought (i) to 
gain for itself rights it no longer possessed as a defaulting ten-
ant and (ii) to strip Walker's ability and right to administer and 
monitor its own substitute lease; and (iii) to effectively modify 
the original judgment obtained by Walker. As such, Sparks' motion 
was a motion for recovery under the lease. 
In Utah, a party is entitled to an award for attorney's fees 
only if provided by statute or by contract. Tholen v. Sandy City, 
849 P. 2d 592, 596 (Utah App. 1993) . And, where a contract provides 
for the recovery of attorney's fees, it is a mistake of law to 
award less than the amount provided for in the contract. Saunders 
v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574, 579 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted). 
Article 46 of the Lease provided for the recovery of attorneys fees 
to the non-defaulting party in a suit brought for the recovery of 
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possession or rents due under the terms of the Lease. At trial 
Sparks was found to be the defaulting party. After judgment had 
been entered against Sparks, Sparks filed its motion seeking relief 
under the lease and to modify the previous judgment, which motion 
was denied. It was a mistake of law for the district court to 
attempt to limit the scope of Article 46. Accordingly, Walker is 
entitled to an award of attorneys fee's in successfully defending 
against Sparks post-judgment motion. Saunders, 818 P.2d at 579. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY DENYING WALKER'S REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEYS FEES INCURRED IN BRINGING ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT DATED SEPTEMBER 8# 1993. 
As set forth in the Brief of Appellee, Walker filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment on the 8th of September, 1993 requesting judg-
ment against Sparks in the sum of $921.70 together with interest 
and attorney's fees. Brief of Appellee at 25; R. 834. Walker's 
motion was scheduled for oral argument on the 24th of September, 
1993. At the Sept. 24th hearing, Sparks tendered the $921.70 to 
Walker. Walker requested an award of attorney's fees incurred in 
bringing the motion for summary judgment, which request the 
district court denied. R. 895, 860, 906. 
Walker asserts that it is entitled to an award of $300.00 for 
attorney's fees incurred in bringing its Motion for Summary 
Judgment for the same reasons it is entitled to an award for 
attorney's fees incurred in successfully defending against Sparks' 
motion. Sparks makes much of some of the district court's 
statements regarding its reasons for denying an award attorney's 
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fees relative to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellant's 
Reply Brief at 19-20. However, Sparks' selective recall is once 
again misleading. 
At the hearing, Counsel for Walker indicated that Sparks pos-
sessed the same documents that Walker had from which it could ver-
ify the delinquent amounts. Sparks had possession of copies of the 
Gasperini lease and the Sparks lease from which Sparks could com-
pute the monthly deficiencies. R. 900. Furthermore, Sparks 
acknowledged that it received correspondence from Walker's counsel 
as well as statements from Walker's property manager setting forth 
the amounts due and owing. R. 896. Apparently Sparks believed it 
is entitled to more, such as accountings, affidavits from the 
property manager, and additional documentation. R. 896-97. How-
ever, Sparks has never provided any caselaw or contractual support 
for an argument that it is entitled to demand accountings and 
affidavits. Nor did the district court spell out precisely what 
type of documents Walker must supply Sparks. The only duty imposed 
by the district court was that Walker was to "provide adequate 
information to determine a question of arrearage," which Walker 
did. R. 906. 
Since Sparks at all times was provided with information suffi-
cient from which to determine its monthly obligation and since 
Sparks did not pay such obligation, forcing Walker to bring a 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Walker is entitled under the contract 
to an award of attorney's fees in bringing such motion. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Walker requests that this Court 
overturn the district court's denial of Walker's motions for 
attorney's fees incurred in defending against Sparks' Motion to 
Assign Lease or in the Alternative Motion for Declaratory Relief 
and in bringing its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this -v^7 day of^September, 1994. ¥- — - - v /J / z' ' 
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